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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual, 
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., and 
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 
NEBEKER, a Utah professional 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 940486-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I 
Did the trial court err in ruling that a dissolved corporation had no standing to 
pursue a claim that arose after dissolution? Did the Court further err in ruling 
that wind-up actions of a corporation did not include the kind of litigation 
commenced by Andersen's Ford? 
ISSUE II 
Did the trial court err in ruling that Plaintiff Roland Holman, as a matter of law, 
was not the proper party plaintiff to bring this legal malpractice action? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: 
Both issues raise questions of law that the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. The Court of Appeals will affirm a trial 
court's decision to grant a Motion to Dismiss only if it appears that Plaintiff cannot prove any 
set of facts in support of its claim. Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 243 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 
18 (Ct. App. July 13, 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
The dissolution of a corporation . . . by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution 
by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code . . . shall not take away 
or impair any remedy available to . . . the corporation, its directors, officers or 
shareholders, for any right or claim existing . . . prior to such dissolution if 
action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date 
of such dissolution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1991) (emphasis added).1 
Section 16-10-101 provides in pertinent part that 
notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation . . . by the issuance of a 
certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
. . . the corporate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for 
the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution, and 
to effect such purposes such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental 
and necessary powers. 
1
 Although Utah's Business Corporation Act was repealed in 1992 and reenacted as the 
Revised Business Corporation Act in 1992, § 16-10(a)-1704 provides that the act's revisions do 
not affect "the operation of [a] statute or any action taken under it before its repeal." 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1991).2 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides in pertinent part that "[e]very action shall 
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) authorizes a motion to dismiss for "failure to join 
an indispensable party." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from Orders of Dismissal entered in two cases, Andersen's Ford v. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, Civil No. 930904013, and Roland Holman v. Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker, Civil No. 940900147, both from the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County. Appellee will refer to the "Andersen's Ford record" and the "Holman record." 
A. Nature of the Case. Defendant adopts Plaintiffs' statement concerning the nature of 
the case. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Defendant adopts Plaintiffs' statement of the Course of 
Proceedings below, with the exception of the final paragraph of that section: 
In response to this argument, plaintiff who had been doing business as Andersen's 
Ford, Inc., contended he was at least a successor in interest to any claim for 
legal malpractice. Further, that defendant was, in fact, also representing plaintiff 
Holman in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
(Emphasis added). The statements contained in the foregoing quoted paragraph are incorrect. 
Holman has never before made the argument that he was a successor in interest to Andersen's 
Ford in any respect, and he cannot now make that claim for the first time on appeal. Ong 
2
 Both §§ 16-10-100 and -101 were amended effective July 1, 1984. Prior to that date the 
words "secretary of state" appeared in place of the words "Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code" near the beginning of those sections. See 1984 Utah Laws Ch. 66, §§ 115 
and 116. The acts which Plaintiffs claim give rise to this action occurred in late 1984. 
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Internal! v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d447, 455 (Utah 1993); Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 
598 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See Holman's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss, Holman record at 109-118. In addition, the statement that Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker was also representing Holman in the bankruptcy proceeding is unsupported by the 
record in either of the cases below. For example, Holman stated in his affidavit (1) that at all 
times after January 1, 1982, Plaintiff held all of the shares of stock of Andersen's Ford, Inc., 
with extremely minor exceptions; (2) that prior to January 1, 1982, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
acted as counsel to Andersen's Ford, Inc., on virtually all its business affairs and secured 
approval from Holman as to legal actions to be taken regarding the corporation; (3) that at all 
times after January 1, 1982, Holman was the sole director or officer directing the actions and 
activities of the corporation and was known to Callister, Duncan & Nebeker to be the sole 
person controlling such actions and operations; and (4) that M[a]t all times during the relationship 
with defendant, [Holman] relied upon the advise [sic] and counsel of defendant on such matters." 
Affidavit of Plaintiff, Holman record at 107-108. These affidavit statements do not establish that 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker was representing Holman individually in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court. Defendant adopts Plaintiffs' statement of the 
disposition of the trial court. 
D. Statement of Facts. Defendant does not adopt Plaintiffs' statement of the facts. 
Plaintiffs' fact statements are unreasonably slanted and are not supported by the record. For 
example, in the first paragraph of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs indicate that 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. was a "family" corporation. Nowhere below, nor in the bankruptcy 
4 
proceeding, was Andersen's Ford, Inc. referred to as a family corporation. Roland Holman was 
not the founder of the business, as the term "family" corporation implies, but acquired the 
business from Glen L. Andersen 26 years after it was begun. Amended Disclosure Statement 
at paragraph 2.1 (Exhibit A to Defendant's Reply Memorandum), Andersen's Ford record at 97. 
Plaintiffs state in the third paragraph of their Statement of Facts that Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker represented both the company and Holman personally. There is no support in the 
record for this statement. The fifth paragraph of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts on page 7 of 
Appellants' Brief again is not supported by the record, Plaintiffs' citation to Holman's affidavit 
(Andersen's Ford record at 81-82) notwithstanding. 
The last sentence of the sixth paragraph of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts on page 7 
indicates that Holman paid the filing expenses and attorney's fees for the bankruptcy proceeding. 
There is no record support for such a statement, and a simple review of the sentence reveals that 
the check was made by Andersen's Ford, Inc. Plaintiffs represent in the seventh paragraph of 
their Statement of Facts that a settlement was reached with the IRS for an amount of 
approximately $56,000. In fact, the stipulated amount was $58,630.76 as of November 15, 
1984. Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, Findings 15 and 16, Andersen's 
Ford record at 140; Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, Findings 13 and 
14, Holman record at 140. 
In paragraph eight of the Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs claim that as a result of Callister, 
Duncan & Nebeker's failure to incorporate the settlement into the Plan of Reorganization or 
obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court of the settlement, the IRS in 1990 demanded an 
additional amount of approximately $122,000 for payment of taxes, interest and penalties. That 
5 
statement is a gross mischaracterization of the IRS's actions. The IRS claimed that Hilton did 
not have the authority to enter into the agreement with Andersen's Ford. It is clear, however, 
that the IRS would have taken that position even if the Bankruptcy Court had expressly approved 
the agreement or if it had been incorporated into the Plan. The thrust of the IRS's argument was 
that since Andersen's Ford defaulted in its payments under the Plan, the agreement was 
abrogated and the IRS would seek the full amount it had previously claimed was due and owing. 
As Defendant's Statement of Facts will set forth, the agreement reached in November, 1984, 
was that upon Andersen's Ford's payment of the $58,630.76 representing taxes and interest, the 
IRS would have abated all penalties for the tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982. See id-
Andersen's Ford made two payments to the IRS following this agreement; one for 
$40,000 and one for $15,000. Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, Finding 
23, Andersen's Ford record at 142; Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
Finding 21, Holman record at 141-42. In the 1992 litigation between the Internal Revenue 
Service and Andersen's Ford, the bankruptcy court determined that Andersen's Ford had 
underpaid the tax liability through an honest misunderstanding which did not constitute a material 
breach of the agreement, that the IRS was bound by its 1984 agreement with Andersen's Ford, 
and that upon Andersen's Ford's paying the balance of the taxes and interest due that was not 
paid based on the misunderstanding, Andersen's Ford would have fully complied with the 
agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings 14, 15, 31, 37-40, 
Conclusions 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 
Exhibit "B" to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Andersen's Ford record at 26-41. 
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In the final paragraph of their statement of facts, Plaintiffs claim Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker's negligent failure to incorporate the November 1984 agreement with the IRS into the 
record of the bankruptcy court damaged Plaintiffs in the amount of $75,000 for attorney's fees 
and costs and $21,000 which was assessed as additional taxes. Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, 
there were no additional taxes assessed. During the course of making payments under the Plan, 
Andersen's Ford underpaid the amount of taxes it agreed to pay. The additional $21,000 was 
the amount that remained unpaid, along with accrued interest. See id-
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Andersen's Ford, Inc. is a former Utah corporation which had its principal place 
of business in Brigham City, Utah. Andersen's Ford Complaint 1 I, Andersen's Ford record 
at 2. 
2. On September 30, 1982, Andersen's Ford, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved by the 
State of Utah for failure to pay taxes. See Certificate of Dissolution, Andersen's Ford record 
at 24. 
3. Prior to May 2, 1983, Andersen's Ford retained and employed Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. Andersen's Ford Complaint, f III, Andersen's Ford 
record at 3. 
4. On or about May 2, 1983, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, by and through its 
employees, filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition as Case No. 
83C-01222. Andersen's Ford Complaint, 11V, Andersen's Ford record at 4. 
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5. For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Andersen's Ford failed to pay a portion of 
its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS. Andersen's Ford. Inc. v. The United States of 
America (In re: Andersen's Ford, Inc.), Bankruptcy No. 83C-01222, Adversary Proceeding No. 
90PC-0836, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings f 2 [hereafter "Bankruptcy 
Findings and Conclusions"], Andersen's Ford record at 27. 
6. The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983, in Andersen's Ford's 
bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 
in the amount of approximately $154,004.83. Id. % 4, Andersen's Ford record at 27. 
7. The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28, 1984, in Andersen's 
Ford's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, 
and 1982 in the amount of approximately $127,403.09. Id. 1 5, Andersen's Ford record at 28. 
8. Andersen's Ford disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and filed an Objection to the 
Amended Proof of Claim on August 29, 1984. Id. f 6, Andersen's Ford record at 28. 
9. On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order confirming 
Andersen's Ford's Second Amended Plan of Reorganization (the "Plan"). Id- 1 8, Andersen's 
Ford record at 28. 
10. Pursuant to the confirmed Plan, Andersen's Ford was to make the following 
payments to IRS; 
a. On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20 % of its allowed claim plus 
accrued interest; 
b. On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20% of its allowed claim 
plus accrued interest; 
8 
c. On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20% of its allowed claim 
plus accrued interest; 
d. On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20% of its allowed claim 
plus accrued interest; 
e. On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20% of its allowed claim 
plus accrued interest. Id. 1 9, Andersen's Ford record at 28-29. 
11. The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and had knowledge of the 
terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by the Court. Id. f 11, Andersen's Ford record at 
29. 
12. At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the claim of the IRS against 
Andersen's Ford for unpaid taxes for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 had not been resolved. 
The Plan did not specify the amount of tax liability Andersen's Ford owed for those years. Id. 
t 12, Andersen's Ford record at 29. 
13. Both before and after the order confirming the Plan, Andersen's Ford and the IRS 
had numerous communications and exchanged information in an effort to determine Andersen's 
Ford's tax liability. The IRS possessed all relevant information and facts regarding the tax 
liability owed to it by Andersen's Ford. The IRS also knew which credits should have been 
applied to Andersen's Ford's account. Id. % 13, Andersen's Ford record at 29. 
14. On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent Clesse Hilton 
("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his authority and with the approval of his 
supervisor, wrote a letter ("Hilton Letter") to Andersen's Ford in which the IRS stated, among 
other things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax and accrued interest for the 
9 
years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $58,630.76. The determination of this amount was based on 
Hilton's independent review of the account records and documents reflecting taxes owing and 
payments made, and upon information supplied to Hilton by Andersen's Ford. Id. f 14, 
Andersen's Ford record at 29-30. 
15. In the Hilton Letter, the IRS also agreed to abate all penalties for tax years 1980, 
1981 and 1982, upon payment of $58,630.76, together with interest. Id. 115, Andersen's Ford 
record at 30. 
16. The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the result of an attempt on 
Hilton's part to compromise Andersen's Ford's liability, but was his independent determination 
of the actual amount of tax and interest due. He was authorized to abate penalties upon payment 
of the tax and interest in full. Id. 1 16, Andersen's Ford record at 30. 
17. Andersen's Ford accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton Letter as the actual 
amount it owed because the sums represented came within $1,000.00 of the amount Andersen's 
Ford calculated that it owed to the IRS. Id. f 17, Andersen's Ford record at 30. 
18. On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"), the attorney employed 
by Callister, Duncan & Nebeker and handling the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy for Andersen's Ford, 
telephoned the IRS to confirm the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter. The IRS through 
its agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his apparent authority, wrote 
a letter to Prince in which the IRS stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 
15, 1985, for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41. Although 
Prince did not specifically refer to the Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by 
10 
Richards represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued interest. Id. t 23, 
Andersen's Ford record at 31. 
19. On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the IRS in which he confirmed 
that the balance owing as of April 15, 1985, for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$61,715.41. Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all pre-petition tax 
liability of Andersen's Ford would be satisfied. Id. f 24, Andersen's Ford record at 31. 
20. The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17, 1985 letter. Id. 1 25, 
Andersen's Ford record at 31. 
21. After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was reached between 
Andersen's Ford and the IRS, Andersen's Ford made payments to the IRS that it intended to be 
applied according to the Plan and the agreement. Id. 1 30, Andersen's Ford record at 32. 
22. Andersen's Ford made its first payment in August of 1985 in the amount of 
$40,000. The payment prepaid the obligation according to the terms of the payment schedule 
in the confirmed Plan. Andersen's Ford paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in December of 
1988. Id. 1 31, Andersen's Ford record at 33. 
23. Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default or otherwise indicate 
to Andersen's Ford that it was in default under the Plan or that the IRS expected payment to 
have been made immediately after the agreement was reached in November 1984. Id. f 32, 
Andersen's Ford record at 33. 
24. On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS attempted to collect 
the tax liability owed by Andersen's Ford from Roland Holman, an officer of Andersen's Ford, 
11 
Inc., as a responsible party. Each time the IRS was informed that Andersen's Ford was paying 
according to the Hilton Letter and the Plan. Id. 1 33, Andersen's Ford record at 33. 
25. The IRS maintained an active collection ledger on Andersen's Ford between 1984 
and 1990, with a variety of agents responsible for monitoring the account. Id. f 34, Andersen's 
Ford record at 33. 
26. Clark Holfeltz ("Holfeltz"), a revenue agent, reviewed the collection on the 
account in 1988. He suspected that certain of the payments had been misapplied and questioned 
whether Andersen's Ford had complied with the Plan. Holfeltz reconciled the account and no 
notice of default was served upon Andersen's Ford. Id. f 35, Andersen's Ford record at 33. 
27. In 1990, the IRS took the position that because Andersen's Ford breached its 
agreement with the IRS (even assuming the enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the 
payment schedule under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments, it was entitled to 
renew its claim to the full tax liability of Andersen's Ford, including penalties and interest. 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. v. United States of America (In re: Andersen's Ford, Inc.), Bankruptcy 
No. 83C-01222, Adversary Proceeding No. 90PC-0836, Government's Trial Brief pp. 7, 9, 16, 
Andersen's Ford record at 43-67. 
28. Andersen's Ford received a letter dated October 27, 1990, wherein the IRS 
informed Andersen's Ford that it had recomputed Andersen's Ford's tax liability and 
$127,644.31 was due on the alleged default of the Chapter 11 Plan. The IRS also demanded 
payment of the new amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set aside the order of 
confirmation or move to convert the case to a Chapter 7. After October 27, 1990, the IRS 
posited a variety of other figures representing the amount due based on various methods of 
12 
applying payments made on the debt. Bankruptcy Findings and Conclusions, Finding 1 36, 
Andersen's Ford record at 33-34. 
29. Andersen's Ford brought the action for declaratory relief and injunction against 
the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy Court to have Andersen's Ford's obligation to the IRS 
declared to be paid in full and to enjoin further collection efforts. 
30. Andersen's Ford prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment Action where the court 
ruled that the Hilton Letter was binding on the IRS. Bankruptcy Findings and Conclusions, 
Findings ifl 26-30, Conclusion f 6, Andersen's Ford record at 26-41. 
31. In spite of the favorable result, Andersen's Ford, Inc. brought the action below 
to attempt to recover from Callister, Duncan & Nebeker its fees and costs incurred in pursuing 
the Declaratory Judgment Action. Andersen's Ford record at 2-8. 
32. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, 
for Summary Judgment, which was granted. See Statement of Undisputed Facts and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, Andersen's Ford record at 137-145 and 146-147. 
33. Despite the fact that Andersen's Ford's action was dismissed with prejudice, 
Roland Holman filed his Complaint alleging that since the corporation, Andersen's Ford, was 
dissolved on September 30, 1982, Holman continued to operate the business under the trade 
name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and to "remain a client of the Defendant." Andersen's Ford 
record at 2-9. 
34. Roland Holman was a creditor of Andersen's Ford, Inc. See Second Amended 
Plan of Reorganization in Andersen's Ford bankruptcy case, f 3.2, page 10, a copy of which 
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is attached as Exhibit "F" to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
its Motion to Dismiss, Holman record at 92. 
35. Roland Holman was represented to be an officer and director of Andersen's Ford 
in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy. Id., f 5.1(c), page 12, Holman record at 94. 
36. The Second Amended Plan contained a provision preventing the Internal Revenue 
Service from proceeding against Roland Holman to collect taxes, penalties or interest owed by 
Andersen's Ford, so long as Andersen's Ford was current on all payments owed to the IRS 
under the Plan. Id., f 12.1, page 21, Holman record at 103. 
37. The Second Amended Plan was signed by Roland Holman in his capacity as 
President of Andersen's Ford, Inc. The signature block appears as follows on the Second 
Amended Plan: 
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC. 
By: /s/ Roland Holman 
Its: I si President 
Id., page 22, Holman record at 104. 
38. Prior to May 2, 1983, Andersen's Ford retained and employed Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, f 37, Holman record at 145. 
39. It was the corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc., and not Roland Holman, who 
remained a client of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, and it was Andersen's Ford, Inc. on whose 
behalf Callister, Duncan & Nebeker filed a Chapter 11 Petition in Bankruptcy. Id. f 38, 
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Holman record at 145; Andersen's Ford Complaint, 11 3 and 4, Andersen's Ford record at 3; 
Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, 11 4 and 5; Andersen's Ford record at 
138. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: Under the common law, the dissolution of a corporation ended its existence, 
and all actions by or against it, even those pending, were abated. All states, including Utah, 
have adopted corporation acts which extend the life of corporations after dissolution for certain 
purposes and for limited amounts of time. Utah's corporate continuation statute in effect at the 
time of Andersen's Ford, Inc.'s dissolution in September 1982 was Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-
100, which extended the time the corporation, officers, directors or shareholders thereof could 
sue or be sued with respect to claims existing on the date of dissolution for two years following 
dissolution. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 provided that the corporate existence should continue 
for the purpose of winding up its affairs with respect to any property or assets which had not 
been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to the dissolution. Andersen's Ford's claim arose 
after dissolution. Neither §§ 16-10-100 nor -101 specifically addresses claims arising after 
dissolution. Under the common law, however, such claims could not be brought by or against 
a dissolved corporation. Consequently, Andersen's Ford does not have standing in 1993 to bring 
a malpractice action against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. Neither the Utah corporate statutes 
nor the common law become unconstitutional statutes of repose as contended by Plaintiffs. The 
issue is not about the time in which a claim can be brought. The issue is whether Andersen's 
Ford had standing to bring the claim in the first instance. Since it does not, the Court's 
dismissal of the Andersen's Ford complaint against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker was proper. 
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Defendant is not estopped to claim that Andersen's Ford lacks standing. Plaintiffs cannot 
establish even the first element of an estoppel defense, which is a statement, admission, act or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted. 
Point II: Callister, Duncan & Nebeker is entitled to have any claim against it brought 
by the real party in interest and to have a case dismissed if there is a failure to join an 
indispensable party. Roland Holman, an individual, is not the real party in interest for the 
purposes of a malpractice action against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. Holman was neither the 
client nor the debtor in possession in bankruptcy. Many courts have held that partners of 
partnerships and officers of corporations are not entitled to maintain claims in their own behalf 
that belong to the entity. Holman is bound by his judicial admissions in the Andersen's Ford 
case, below, and in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. In both cases, Andersen's Ford 
(through Holman, its president) represented that it was the client of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
and the debtor in bankruptcy. One of the first elements of an attorney malpractice action is the 
proof of an attorney-client relationship. There was no attorney-client relationship between 
Holman and Andersen's Ford. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in ruling that Holman was not the proper 
party plaintiff because attorney-client relationships can arise through implication. Plaintiffs 
failed to raise this argument below, and are precluded from raising it for the first time on 
appeal. Nevertheless, they cannot prevail on the merits based on the authority they cited in 
support of this argument. The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of the proposition that implied 
attorney-client relationships can arise are conflict of interest cases in which law firms 
representing entities sought to sue the individual principals in other matters. The courts in both 
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cases cited by Plaintiffs held that based on the facts before them, there arose an implied 
attorney-client relationship between the law firms and the individuals. This is not a conflict of 
interest case. While a conflict of interest issue may be raised if Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
were to represent a party against Roland Holman, this case concerns Holman's ability, as an 
individual, to maintain a legal malpractice cause of action against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
based on its representation of Andersen's Ford, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is about the ability of a dissolved corporation to commence and maintain a 
lawsuit a decade after its dissolution. This case is about standing. It is not about an 
unconstitutional statute of repose, nor does it have anything to do with equitable estoppel. This 
case is also about the right of a defendant to have a lawsuit against it prosecuted by the real 
party in interest. Indeed, this case is not about attorney malpractice. The acts of which 
Plaintiffs complain are attributable to the Internal Revenue Service, against whom Plaintiffs had 
a remedy for the damages they incurred in the form of costs and attorney's fees if a court 
determined the IRS's actions to have been frivolous.3 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. was dissolved by the State of Utah on September 30, 1982, for 
failure to pay taxes, and, as a consequence, it lacked standing to bring a malpractice action 
3
 See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which provides: "Except as 
otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than 
the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to 
subsection (a)' incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), 
including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United 
States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of 
the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 
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against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker in 1993. Roland Holman also does not have standing to 
maintain an action against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker because he is not the real party in 
interest and was not the entity represented by Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. Accordingly, the 
trial courts properly dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaints with prejudice. 
POINT I 
ANDERSEN'S FORD LACKS STANDING TO MAINTAIN A LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE ACTION AGAINST CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
A. Introduction. 
Under common law, dissolution of a corporation "puts an end to its existence, the result 
may be likened to the death of a natural person." Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One 
Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg.. 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937). Consequently, "after a corporation is 
dissolved, it is incapable of maintaining an action; and all such actions pending at the time of 
dissolution abate, in the absence of a statute to the contrary." Id.; see also Platz v. Int'l 
Smelting Co., 213 P. 187, 190 (Utah 1922) ("The effect of a legal dissolution of a corporation 
is to do away with and terminate the legal entity. . . . If such be the legal effect of the 
dissolution, there was no legal entity at the time of filing. . . ."). That rule of law applies 
equally to shareholders or others who seek to assert claims either on behalf of or as assignees 
of corporate rights. See MBC. Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 639 (N.H. 1979). 
Utah, consistent with many jurisdictions, ameliorated the common law rule by adopting 
the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") in 1961. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-1 (1991) (Compiler's Notes). The MBCA provides for survival of corporate remedies 
as pursued by the corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders for a period of two years 
after dissolution. Because the survival statute extends the period to pursue claims otherwise 
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extinguished by the common law, the terms of the statute must be strictly met for a claim to be 
pursued. See MBC, Inc. v. Engel, 397 A.2d 636, 638 (N.H. 1979).4 The statute is not subject 
to equitable exceptions. Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank of DeKalb, 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct. 
App. 1972). 
B. The Utah Statute. 
The relevant Utah statute provides in part: 
The dissolution of a corporation . . . (1) by the issuance of a certificate of 
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code . . . shall not 
take away or impair any remedy available t6 . . . the corporation, its directors, 
officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing . . . prior to such 
dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years 
after the date of such dissolution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1991) (emphasis added).5 
Thus Utah, like most other states, extended the death of a corporation for two years in 
order for the corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders, to pursue any right or claim 
which existed prior to the dissolution if the action was commenced within two years after the 
date of the dissolution. 
Andersen's Ford correctly pointed out below that its claims arose after dissolution; 
therefore, Andersen's Ford argued that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 governs, which provides 
that 
4
 See also Chicago Title, 302 U.S. at 127-28 ("How long and upon what terms a state-
created corporation may continue to exist is a matter exclusively of state power. The 
circumstances under which the power shall be exercised and the extent to which it shall be 
carried are matters of state policy, to be decided by the State Legislature.") (citations omitted). 
5
 Although Utah's Business Corporation Act was revised in 1992, § 16-10a-1704 provides 
that the Act's revisions do not affect "the operation of [a] statute or any action taken under it 
before its repeal." 
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notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation . . . by the issuance of a 
certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
. . . the corporate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for 
the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution, and 
to effect such purposes such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental 
and necessary powers.6 
Andersen's Ford also argued below and Plaintiffs argue on appeal that if the legal 
malpractice claim is barred, then Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 is rendered an unconstitutional 
statute of repose. 
Plaintiffs overlook the fact that corporations are creatures of statute, and that their 
existence and ability to act or otherwise conduct business is defined by statute. If neither §16-
10-100 nor § 16-10-101 apply, then one must resort to the common law to determine whether 
a dissolved corporation can maintain a lawsuit for claims which arose after dissolution. In Platz 
v. Int'l Smelting Co.. 213 P. 187 (Utah 1922), the Supreme Court explained that M[t]he effect 
of a legal dissolution of a corporation is to do away with and terminate the legal entity. . . . 
If such be the legal effect of the dissolution, there was no legal entity at the time of filing." Id. 
at 190. 
In Patterson v. Missouri Valley Steel. 229 Kan. 481, 625 P.2d 483 (1981), the Court 
upheld dismissal of a lawsuit against a dissolved corporation. The Kansas statute allowed a 
6
 The trial court, Judge Lewis presiding, correctly found that the malpractice action filed by 
Andersen's Ford against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker was not a wind-up action. That this is 
a correct result is evidenced by the words of the statute itself, which indicate that the corporate 
existence shall continue "for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and 
assets which have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution." The 
legal malpractice action is neither property nor an asset which had not been distributed or 
disposed of prior to dissolution. 
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dissolved corporation to sue or be sued for three years after dissolution. The negligence and 
product liability lawsuit was not served on the corporate defendant until two weeks after the 
three-year period had passed. In Patterson, the Kansas Supreme Court relied on and quoted an 
earlier United States District Court decision construing the Delaware corporate statute upon 
which the Kansas statute was patterned. That case, Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Services 
Corporation, 404 F. Supp. 726 (D. Md. 1975), involved the capacity of a dissolved corporation 
to be sued in a products liability action more than three years after its voluntary dissolution. 
The Johnson court stated: 
"At common law, the dissolution of a corporation was its civil death; 
dissolution abated all pending actions by and against a corporation, thus 
terminating abruptly its capacity to sue and be sued. 
In order to alter the common law and prolong the life of a corporation past 
dissolution, statutory authority is necessary. 
The common law has been supplanted in Delaware, as in all states, by a 
statute which prolongs the life of a corporation in order to allow a corporation to 
dispose of its affairs in an orderly fashion." 
625 P.2d at 489 (quoting Johnson, 404 F. Supp. at 730) (citations omitted in Patterson). 
Similarly, in Brown v. Kleen Kut Manufacturing Co., 238 Kan. 642, 714 P.2d 942 
(1986), the Kansas Supreme Court, applying Ohio law, dismissed a products liability lawsuit 
against a corporation which had been dissolved for 22 years. It again stated the principle that 
"[a]t common law, a corporation's capacity to sue or be sued terminated when the corporation 
was legally dissolved." Id. at 945 (citing 16A Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 8142 (rev. perm. ed. 1979)). In Brown, the Court also upheld summary 
judgment which was granted in favor of Kleen Kut's successors, Toledo Scale Corporation, 
Reliance Electric and Engineering Company, and Reliance Electric Company. The Court noted 
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that Ohio's general rule of successor liability is that when one company sells or transfers its 
assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the first company 
unless there is an express or implied agreement to assume the first company's debts and 
obligations or that the circumstances warrant a finding that there was a consolidation or merger 
of the corporations, or that the transaction was fraudulent. Id. at 946-47.7 
Pacesetter Real Estate, Inc. v. Fasules. 53 Wash. App. 463, 767 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 
1989), more closely resembles the facts in the case before this Court, because it involved the 
ability of a dissolved corporation to maintain a suit rather than its capacity to be sued. In that 
case, the corporation filed an action seeking injunctive relief from a non-judicial foreclosure and 
a determination that a loan was usurious. The trial court found in favor of the corporation and 
the defendant appealed. He contended first that the corporation lacked standing to commence 
or maintain the action because of its failure to comply with the license fee requirements of a 
Washington statute which forbade corporations from commencing or maintaining any suits 
without alleging and proving that it had paid all of its fees and penalties due the State of 
Washington. At trial, the corporation's representative admitted that license fees had not been 
paid for several years. The corporation's representatives, however, contended that the 
7
 As indicated in the Statement of the Case section of this brief, Holman has contended for 
the first time on appeal that he was a successor in interest to any claim Andersen's Ford had for 
malpractice. Because he did not raise that claim below, he cannot raise it on appeal. Even if 
it were properly raised on appeal, however, there is nothing to support Holman's claim that he 
did succeed to any of Andersen's Ford's claims, debts or liabilities. Holman made no claim in 
his Complaint that he was the successor in interest to any of Andersen's Ford's claims, and he 
made no allegations concerning his alleged taking over of the business. Under Brown v. Kleen 
Kut, unless there is some evidence that a successor entity assumed liabilities of the first entity 
(or conversely, as in the case where the successor entity is the plaintiff, unless there is evidence 
that the successor acceded to any claims of the predecessor) the action must be dismissed. 
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corporation nevertheless had standing to sue under Washington's corporate survival statute, 
which is virtually identical to Utah's § 16-10-100. Under that statute, the corporation had two 
years after its dissolution date of December 30, 1983, in which to initiate an action arising from 
pre-dissolution transactions. The Washington Court of Appeals noted that the action before it 
was filed beyond the two-year limitation, and dealt with one loan made subsequent to the two-
year extension period. The Court of Appeals stated: 
While the Legislature expressly provides for administrative dissolution 
following a corporation's failure to pay annual license fees, and farther provides 
for timely reinstatement following such dissolution, it fails to provide direction 
as to the status of a corporation so dissolved. Early Washington case law, 
however, holds a corporation's failure to apply for reinstatement within the time 
permitted results in irrevocable dissolution. This view is consistent with case law 
across the country. Since Pacesetter failed to comply with the two-year 
reinstatement period, it lacks standing to bring this action. 
767 P.2d at 964-65 (citations omitted). 
It is evident, therefore, that this case is not about an unconstitutional statute of repose. 
It is manifestly about Andersen's Ford's capacity to sue nearly one decade following its 
dissolution. It simply does not have standing to maintain the action against Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker. Standing is something completely different from the abrogation of a cause of action 
by a statute of repose. 
The case of Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 411 N.E.2d 1153 (111. Ct. App. 1980), 
is instructive with respect to this point. In Blankenship, plaintiff filed a complaint in which she 
alleged that her hand became caught and was injured in a machine manufactured by Demmler 
Manufacturing. She named as defendants Demmler Manufacturing Co., a dissolved corporation, 
John Demmler, its former president and director, and Acme - Cleveland Corporation, who 
plaintiff claimed acquired the assets of Demmler Manufacturing and succeeded to the rights and 
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liabilities of that company. It is interesting to note that the acquisition took place in 1968 and 
that the complaint was not filed until 1977, approximately nine years later. 
In response to the complaint, John Demmler moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was 
barred as to him and Demmler Manufacturing because it had not been brought within two years 
of the company's dissolution as required by an Illinois statute identical to Utah Code Ann. §16-
10-100. The trial court granted defendant John Demmler's motion to dismiss and ordered 
Demmler Manufacturing stricken from the pleadings. 
In affirming the trial court's decision, the appeals court noted that: "A corporation can 
exist only under the express laws of the state by which it was created. Accordingly, the right 
to sue a dissolved corporation is limited to the time established by the legislature." Id. at 1156. 
The court went on to note that in Illinois, the legislature had determined that a corporation may 
be sued for liabilities incurred prior to dissolution if suit is commenced within two years of the 
dissolution. Id. 
Interestingly, the plaintiff in Blankenship asserted the same argument as Plaintiffs do in 
the case at hand, that the cited section was not applicable to her claim because it was a 
"survival" statute and therefore was inapposite to claims which do not accrue until after 
dissolution. The court stated in response as follows: 
Although we agree that plaintiffs claim cannot be barred as a pre-dissolution 
claim pursuant to section 94, the rationale underlying this survival statute supports 
our decision that there is no basis for allowing a cause of action which accrues 
after dissolution to be brought against a dissolved corporation. 
One of the main purposes of the survival statute is to extend the life of a 
corporation for two years following dissolution so that suits which ordinarily 
would have abated may be brought by and against the corporation. Once this 
period extending the existence of the corporation has ended, however, the 
corporation cannot sue or be sued. Consequently, we believe that the survival 
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statute reflects a legislative intent to establish a definite point in time when a 
corporation ceases to exist. Since a cause of action based on strict liability 
accrues at the time of the injury, the time period provided in the survival statute 
had expired several years before plaintiffs claim even arose. In the absence of 
a statute permitting a cause of action which accrues after dissolution to be brought 
against a dissolved corporation, plaintiff has no valid cause of action against 
Demmler Manufacturing. 
Id. at 1156-1157 (citations omitted). 
Clearly, since there is no statute in Utah permitting a corporation to commence a cause 
of action after the expiration of the two-year survival period, Andersen's Ford as a dissolved 
corporation had no standing to bring its cause of action against Defendant. 
C. Estoppel Does Not Apply. 
Plaintiffs argue nevertheless that Callister, Duncan & Nebeker should be estopped from 
relying on Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-100 and -101 (and, by extension, the common law) to 
insulate it from Plaintiffs' legal malpractice action. Below, Plaintiffs relied on CECO v. 
Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), in support of its estoppel argument. In 
CECO, the Utah Supreme Court noted that estoppel is an equitable defense requiring proof of 
three elements: 
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or 
not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would not result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to 
act. 
Id. at 969-70 (citations omitted). A careful reading of CECO reveals that Plaintiffs have not 
presented any facts which would establish even the first element of an estoppel defense. 
Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their asserted cause of action is not 
inconsistent with any prior statements, admissions, acts, or failure to act. Even assuming the 
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truthfulness and accuracy of the Affidavit of Roland L. Holman (Andersen's Ford record at 81-
82), there is no allegation of a prior statement by Defendant that Andersen's Ford's dissolved 
status would not affect its ability to pursue causes of action arising in the future. Attorney John 
Allen's purported representation that the dissolved status of Plaintiff Andersen's Ford would not 
have any effect on its Chapter 11 proceedings and would not preclude its continued business 
operations under a Chapter 11 plan is not a representation that a corporation that was dissolved 
in 1982 would have the legal status in 1993, eleven years later, to bring an action in the district 
courts of Utah. 
POINT II 
HOLMAN IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO MAINTAIN A LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
A. Causes of Action Must Be Prosecuted bv the Real Party in Interest. 
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Rule 12(b)(7) authorizes a motion to dismiss 
based on the failure to join an indispensable party. Defendant has the right to have causes of 
action prosecuted by the real party in interest 
so that the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another and 
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the 
real owner of the cause. 
Shaw v. Jeppson. 121 Utah 1955, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (1952) (citations omitted). 
In Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984), a partner in a joint venture brought an 
action against potential investors in the partnership for tortious interference with contract and 
related causes of action. The plaintiff did not include the partnership itself nor his partner as 
plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that plaintiff failed to join an 
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indispensable party, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 759. The Court held that the 
action was required to have been brought by either the partnership or, if the partnership could 
not sue in its own name, by all of the partners. The Court rejected Plaintiff's argument that he 
should be entitled to go forward in his individual capacity to recover his portion of the 
partnership's claim.8 The Court explained that Rules 19(a) and 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure both seek to promote judicial economy and fairness to the parties in litigation. 
The purpose of Rule 19(a), "which requires a joinder of indispensable 
parties as a condition to suit, is to guard against the entry of judgments which 
might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence." In addition, by 
requiring joinder of necessary parties. Rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties 
who are present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims over 
the same subject matter as the original litigation. 
Rule 17(a) serves essentially the same policy by requiring an action to be 
brought by the real party in interest. 
Id. at 760 (quoting Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price Water Users 
Association. 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982)). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court similarly lauds the purpose of Rule 17(a): 
We introduce the subject of mootness by recalling that a litigant must be 
the real party in interest to have standing to institute an action against another 
party. The converse of that proposition is that the suit that is filed or defended 
by a party who is not the real party in interest must be dismissed. This 
requirement benefits the courts and the defendant in a civil action. It eliminates 
unnecessary actions and assures a defendant that only those actions brought by the 
party entitled to assert them will be prosecuted, thus protecting the defendant 
from the vexation of the multiplicity of actions, or the possible burden of multiple 
recoveries, all emanating from the same cause. 
Mari v. Rawlins Nat'l Bank of Rawlins. 794 P.2d 85, 88 (Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted). 
8A partner would be in a better position than an officer or shareholder of a corporation to 
individually pursue a claim belonging to the entity. 
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In this case, Roland Holman is not the real party in interest. He did not hire Defendant 
to file a Chapter 11 petition on his behalf and he was not the debtor in bankruptcy. Andersen's 
Ford Complaint, f f III and IV, Andersen's Ford record at 2. Holman attempts to capitalize on 
the trial court's dismissal of Andersen's Ford's complaint against Defendant by postulating that 
if the corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc., had no corporate existence for the purpose of bringing 
a malpractice action against Defendant in 1993, then the corporation must have had no corporate 
existence more than ten years earlier for the purpose of hiring Defendant to represent it in a 
Chapter 11 proceeding. Holman's attempt to thus characterize the issues is valiant but must fail. 
Holman apparently confuses Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-100 and 16-10-101. Under either 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-100 or -101, Andersen's Ford had the authority to commence Chapter 
11 proceedings as a debtor in possession. It had that authority either under § 16-10-100 because 
it was an action which was appropriate to protecting any remedy, right or claim existing by the 
corporation prior to dissolution (e.g., its claim that the IRS obligation was overstated), or under 
§ 16-10-101 because filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 for reorganization could be 
considered an act of winding up (even though the debtor was attempting to reorganize the 
business). 
More importantly, Holman did not hire Defendant and Holman did not become a debtor 
in possession in bankruptcy. He was characterized as a creditor of Andersen's Ford and its 
President in the Second Amended Plan of Reorganization, f 4.3, p. 10, f 5.1(c), page 12, 
Exhibit "F" to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Holman record at 92, 94. 
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In addition, Holman is bound by his judicial admissions in the Andersen's Ford case and 
in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding for declaratory judgment. In both Andersen's Ford's 
action below and in the declaratory judgment action, Andersen's Ford represented that it was 
the client of Defendant and it was the debtor in bankruptcy. Roland Holman, the President of 
Andersen's Ford, cannot now in good faith make the claim that he individually was the client 
ten years ago and was the debtor in bankruptcy. 
Holman merely acted as an agent of the Plaintiff. He did not, in his individual capacity, 
hire the Defendant to represent any personal liabilities that might have been attributed to him. 
Thus, as part of its statutorily granted continued corporate existence, Andersen's Ford hired the 
Defendant and in turn became the client of the Defendant. Because Andersen's Ford could 
rightfully and did hire the Defendant, Holman lacks standing as a plaintiff and his action against 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker was properly dismissed.9 
B. There Was Not an Attorney-Client Relationship Between Holman and Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker. 
In Utah, "[ajttorney malpractice actions generally require the proof of an attorney-client 
relationship coupled with an accompanying breach of duty inherent in that relationship which 
9
 Section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 108(a)) provides that if nonbankruptcy 
law fixes the time within which the debtor may commence an action and such time has not 
expired prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, such action may be commenced only before 
the later of the end of such period (including any suspensions of the period) and two years 
following the filing of the petition. Andersen's Ford was involuntarily dissolved on September 
30, 1982. OnMay3, 1983, its Chapter 11 petition was filed. The order confirming the Second 
Amended Plan of Reorganization was entered October 4, 1984. The Hilton Letter was dated 
November 2, 1984. Under 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), the corporate continuation period of Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10-100 was extended to May 3, 1985, two years following the filing of the Chapter 
11 petition. Any alleged malpractice committed in connection with preparing the Plan occurred 
during the corporate continuation period as extended by 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) and clearly belongs 
to Andersen's Ford. 
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directly results in actual injury, loss, or damage to the client." Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 
887, 889 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). In this case, Andersen's Ford was the client; Holman 
was not. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker was not hired by Holman to represent and protect his 
individual interests. Without an attorney-client relationship between Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker and Holman, there is no basis upon which Holman has standing to make a claim for 
either negligence or malpractice. Moreover, Holman should be estopped to assert that he, and 
not Andersen's Ford, was the actual client of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. When one chooses 
to incorporate and receive the benefits incident to incorporation, one cannot, when it is 
convenient to do so, ask that the corporate status be ignored. See Kyle v. Beco Corp., 707 P.2d 
378 (Idaho 1985). 
In Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), the 
defendant successfully filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff corporation's general manager as 
plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that under the specific provisions of Rule 
17(a) the plaintiff corporation was the real party in interest: 
The facts of this case should be reiterated. Plaintiff is seeking damages it 
allegedly has sustained by reason of the improper disposition of collateral, the 
title of which plaintiff held and which defendant sold pursuant to an agreement 
executed by plaintiff. Under such circumstances, plaintiff is the real party in 
interest under Rule 17(a), for even though a shareholder owns all, or practically 
all, of the stock in a corporation, such a fact does not authorize him to sue as an 
individual for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation. 
Id. at 1031-32 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the alleged negligence or malpractice cause of action belongs to Andersen's 
Ford, and not to Holman. 
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As set forth above, the Holman case was properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(7) for 
failure to join an indispensable party, namely Defendant's former client, Andersen's Ford. Even 
if Holman had joined Andersen's Ford as a party plaintiff, however, the case was required to 
have been dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court dismissed the 
Andersen's Ford action with prejudice on the grounds that since Andersen's Ford had been 
dissolved in 1982, the legal malpractice action was neither timely under § 16-10-100 nor an act 
of winding up under § 16-10-101. If Andersen's Ford had been a plaintiff in the Holman case, 
the decision in the Andersen's Ford case would have been res judicata to the issues in the 
Holman case, requiring dismissal. See Schonev v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 
(UtahCt. App. 1993).10 
Plaintiffs next argue that Judge Young erred in ruling that Holman was not the proper 
party plaintiff and that the Utah Supreme Court has held that attorney-client relationships can 
arise through implication. Plaintiffs cite Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 
(Utah 1985), for the proposition that in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, 
circumstances may give rise to an implied relationship. Plaintiffs also cite E.F. Hutton& Co. 
\L_Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1971), for the same proposition. Plaintiffs fail to point 
out, however, that both Margulies and E.F. Hutton were conflict of interest cases in which law 
firms representing entities sought to sue the individual principals in other matters. 
10
 Plaintiffs argue in their brief that res judicata does not apply because Holman and 
Andersen's Ford are different entities. Plaintiffs obviously misunderstand the nature of 
Defendant's res judicata argument. If Andersen's Ford had been substituted as the proper party 
plaintiff in the Holman case, then that case would have been required to be dismissed under res 
judicata because it would then have been identical to the Andersen's Ford case which had 
previously been dismissed by Judge Lewis. 
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Importantly, Holman did not raise this argument below and should be precluded from 
raising it on appeal for the first time. The only argument he made at the trial court level was 
that he was doing business as Andersen's Ford subsequent to the September 30, 1982 dissolution 
of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and that he is entitled therefore to maintain the legal malpractice cause 
of action against Defendant. There was no mention below nor argument made that an implied 
attorney-client relationship between the firm and Holman arose. The fact that Holman raised 
the issue below that he, individually, was the client, is not helpful to him. In One Internal 1 v. 
Garner, 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court rejected the position that a new argument 
as to an issue raised below can be made for the first time on appeal. "We decline to honor such 
a distinction. Our concern is whether an argument was addressed in the first instance to the trial 
court." Id. at455n.31. 
Defendant will nevertheless address the merits of Plaintiffs' argument. In Margulies, a 
Salt Lake City law firm represented the Margulieses in a medical malpractice action against 
various doctors. The law firm also represented a Utah limited partnership in an unrelated 
federal court action. Two of the defendant doctors in the medical malpractice action were 
limited partners of the partnership and one of the doctors was a stockholder, former officer and 
director of a corporation which was a co-general partner in the limited partnership. The doctors 
in the medical malpractice action moved to disqualify the law firm from representing the 
plaintiffs therein, and when that motion was denied, an interlocutory appeal was pursued. The 
Supreme Court noted in Margulies that "unless an attorney-client relationship or some fiduciary 
duty existed between Jones, Waldo and the appellants, there could be no conflict of interest 
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created by the firm's representation of the Margulieses in their malpractice suit." Id. at 1200. 
The Court went on to state: 
It should be noted that we do not find that an attorney automatically 
becomes counsel for limited partners when he or she undertakes representation 
of the limited partnership. Ethical Consideration 5-18 of the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility (1977) states that an attorney representing a 
corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the entity rather than to its 
shareholders. A limited partnership is an entity equivalent to a corporation for 
litigation purposes, and therefore representation of a limited partnership does not 
of itself require allegiance to the interests of the limited partners. If the limited 
partners stand to gain nothing more from the attorney's representation of the 
limited partnership than the incidental gain which will accrue to them as partners, 
and not in their individual capacities, no attorney-client relationship should be 
implied. When, however, the individual interests of the limited partners are 
directly involved, as they are here, there may be sufficient grounds for implying 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
Id. at 1200-01 (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court held that the law firm should have withdrawn from the medical 
malpractice action due to the conflict of interest. 
In E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, Houston and New York law firms represented E.F. 
Hutton in an SEC investigation. During the course of the investigation, Brown, the former 
Houston regional vice-president of E.F. Hutton, testified at SEC and bankruptcy hearings about 
a suspect loan transaction. Although both the New York and the Houston lawyers said that they 
told Brown that they were not representing him individually, Brown testified at each hearing, 
without contradiction by the lawyers, that he was individually represented by the lawyers. 
Later, E.F. Hutton sued Brown and was represented in that action by the New York and the 
Houston law firms. Brown moved to disqualify the law firms on the grounds that both firms 
had individually represented him. The court found that E.F. Hutton's opposition to the motion 
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to disqualify failed to overcome the presumption that the New York and Houston partners 
represented Brown when he testified in the SEC and bankruptcy investigations. Id. at 387. 
Brown admits that he cannot recall ever conversing with either firm about 
representing him personally, or paying either firm a fee. But, the relation of 
attorney and client may be implied from the conduct of the parties. It is not 
dependent on the payment of the fee, nor upon the execution of the formal 
contract. The court takes judicial notice that it is not uncommon for corporate 
counsel to represent an individual corporate officer when he is sued as a result 
of actions he has taken within the ambit of his official duties. When this occurs, 
corporate counsel becomes counsel for the individual officer as well, even if the 
corporation pays all of his fee. If the officer is a party to a proceeding, and 
corporate counsel appear on his behalf, an implied relationship between them 
arises. 
Id. at 388. 
The court held that the New York and the Houston law firms should withdraw as counsel 
for E.F. Hutton in the action against Brown because of the conflict of interest. 
The difference, of course, between this case and the Margulies and E.F. Hutton cases, 
is that there is no conflict of interest consideration present in this case. If Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker were today to undertake representation of a party against Roland Holman, there may 
well arise a question whether that representation was proper in light of rules of professional 
conduct regarding conflict of interest situations. It may be, however, that Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker's representation of Andersen's Ford in the early 1980s only benefitted Holman 
incidentally, as an officer of the corporation, and not individually in his own right, in contrast 
to the situation in the Margulies case. In any event, this case is not about a conflict of interest. 
In essence, Holman today maintains that in the early 1980s subsequent to Utah's 
involuntary dissolution of Andersen's Ford, Inc., the business was a sole proprietorship of 
Holman who was doing business in the name of Andersen's Ford. As stated earlier, the 
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problems with this position are myriad. First, there is no record evidence to support that 
Holman was the business. All of the record evidence indicates that Andersen's Ford, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, was the debtor in bankruptcy and the client of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. 
Holman tries to twist the dissolution argument by stating that if the corporation were dissolved 
after September 30, 1982, then the corporation could not have been the entity filing bankruptcy. 
This position is untenable, which leads to the second fallacy in Holman's argument. Either Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10-100 or § 16-10-101 would authorize a dissolved corporation to file a petition 
for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) extended 
the two-year corporate continuation period in Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 to May 3, 1985, two 
years following the filing of the Chapter 11 Petition. What Plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge is 
that while Andersen's Ford had sufficient corporate existence to file and maintain the bankruptcy 
proceeding, it lacked such existence a decade later to file a malpractice action against Callister, 
Duncan & Nebeker. 
CONCLUSION 
Andersen's Ford, Inc., a Utah corporation, was a creature of statute and was dissolved 
involuntarily by the State of Utah on September 30, 1982. Under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100, 
its corporate existence was extended for two years for the purpose of suing or being sued with 
respect to claims existing prior to the dissolution. In addition, under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-
101, the corporate existence of Andersen's Ford was extended for purposes of winding up its 
affairs with respect to property and assets which were not distributed or otherwise disposed of 
prior to the dissolution. Claims which arose in favor of or against Andersen's Ford following 
its dissolution could not be maintained by or against it. Under the common law, the dissolution 
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of a corporation was its civil death and it could not sue or be sued. Indeed, actions existing by 
or against it were abated on dissolution. Consequently, Andersen's Ford did not have standing 
to maintain the legal malpractice action against Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. 
Roland Holman, an individual, was not the client of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker and 
was not the debtor in possession in bankruptcy. At all pertinent times, he was the president of 
Andersen's Ford, a creditor in its bankruptcy, and its major shareholder. Notwithstanding 
Holman's position in Andersen's Ford, Inc. as an officer and shareholder, he, individually, was 
not Callister, Duncan & Nebeker's client in the Chapter 11 proceeding. Because Callister, 
Duncan & Nebeker is entitled to have any action against it prosecuted by the real party in 
interest, it was proper for the trial court to dismiss Holman's action against the firm. In 
addition, no implied relationship between Holman, individually, and Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker arose. Holman failed to raise this issue below and relies on conflict of interest cases 
which have no application in this case. The conflict of interest cases do not support Holman's 
proposition that an implied attorney-client relationship between him and the firm arose based on 
the firm's representation of Andersen's Ford in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker thus respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial courts 
in all respects and to award it its costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this QU day of September, 1994. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stqgjien G. Morgan 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this *Craay of September, 1994, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be hand delivered to the following: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 




Andersen's Ford case: 
Court's minute entry 
Statement of Undisputed Facts and Issues of Law 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice 
Holman case: 
Statement of Undisputed Facts and Issues of Law 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 




CASE NO. 930904013 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, the Court having 
reviewed the Motion, Memorandum in support and Reply Memorandum and 
the Memorandum in opposition, and the Court being fully advised and 
finding good cause, rules as stated herein. 
The Motion to Dismiss is granted. This Court finds that under 
the uncontroverted facts, the plaintiff corporation was 
involuntarily dissolved in September of 1982 and plaintiff's claim 
arose after dissolution. This Court cannot conclude that "wind up" 
actions include initiatiitef litigation. 
ANDERSEN'S FORD V. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER PAGE TWO RULING 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an Order and detailed 
Findings consistent with the material f^ Gfes referenced in the 
Memoranda, and consistent with this Ruling. -9*^ K***><r 
Dated this l$j .day of N 
y LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE' 
n.n,^8 
ANDERSEN'S FORD V. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER PAGE TWO RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct qppy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this / day of 
November, 1993: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Dennis R. James 
Attorneys for Defendant 
136 S. Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
£z 
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC., a Utah 
corporation, : STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, : 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 
NEBEKER, a Utah professional : Civil No. 930904013 
corporation, : 
: Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant. : 
The following facts were undisputed by the parties for 
purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: 
UNDISPUTED FACT8 
1. Plaintiff Andersen"s Ford, Inc. is a former Utah 
corporation which had its principal place of business in Brigham 
City, Utah. 
2. On September 30, 1982, Andersen1s Ford, Inc. was 
involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay 
taxes. 
3. For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Plaintiff failed to 
pay a portion of its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS. 
n r* * *> "i 
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4. Prior to May 2, 1983, Plaintiff retained and employed 
Defendant to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. 
5* On or about May 2, 1983, Defendant, by and through its 
employees, filed on behalf of the Plaintiff the aforementioned 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding as Case No, 83C-01222. 
6. Plaintiff set forth in its Chapter 11 Plan of 
Reorganization Amended Disclosure Statement its purpose in filing 
as follows: 
2.11 The filing of Debtors Chapter 11 proceeding in 
May 1983 was necessitated by actions being taken by the 
Internal Revenue Service to seize and dispose of various 
assets of the Debtor in an effort to reduce the out-
standing for [sic] liability of the debtor for the period 
of 1980-1982. The tax liability is now to be paid 
pursuant to the terms of Debtors Plan of Reorganization, 
which will enable the Debtor to pay its delinquent taxes 
in installments over a period of five years, while 
maintaining itself as an ongoing, healthy business 
operation in the meantime. 
2.12 The Debtor believes that it has put itself on 
a sound financial footing, through its reduced debt 
structure and work force, that will allow it to more 
easily deal with fluctuations in the national or local 
economy. Debtor further submits that confirmation of the 
Plan filed by the Debtor is not likely to be followed by 
a liquidation of or need for further financial reorgani-
zation by the Debtor. 
7. The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983f 
in Plaintifffs bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and 
penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 in the amount of 
approximately $154,004.83. 
8. The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28, 
1984, in Plaintifffs bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and 
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penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 in the amount of 
approximately $127,403.09. 
9. Plaintiff disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and filed an 
Objection to the Amended Proof of Claim on August 29, 1984. 
10. On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
confirming Plaintiff's Second Amended Plan. 
11. Pursuant to the confirmed Plan of Reorganization (the 
"Plan"), Plaintiff was to make the following payments to IRS; 
a. On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
b. On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
c. On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
d. On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
e. On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest. 
12. The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and 
had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by 
the Court. 
13. At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the 
claim of the IRS against Plaintiff for unpaid taxes for the years 
1980, 1981 and 1982 had not been resolved. The Plan did not 
specify the amount of tax liability Plaintiff owed for said years. 
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14. Both before and after the order confirming the Plan, 
Plaintiff and the IRS had numerous communications and exchanged 
information in an effort to determine Plaintiff's tax liability. 
The IRS possessed all relevant information and facts regarding the 
tax liability owed to it by Plaintiff. The IRS also knew which 
credits should have been applied to Plaintiff's account. 
15. On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent 
Clesse Hilton ("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his 
authority and with the approval of his supervisor, wrote a letter 
("Hilton Letter") to Plaintiff in which the IRS stated, among other 
things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax and 
accrued interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $58,630.76. 
The determination of this amount was based on Hilton's independent 
review of the account records and documents reflecting taxes owing 
and payments made, and upon information supplied to Hilton by 
Plaintiff. 
16. By the Hilton Letter the IRS also agreed to abate all 
penalties for tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982, upon payment of 
$58,630.76, together with interest. 
17. The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the 
result of an attempt on Hilton's part to compromise Plaintiff's 
liability, but was his independent determination of the actual 
amount of tax and interest due. He was authorized to abate 
penalties upon payment of the tax and interest in full. 
18. Plaintiff accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton 
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Letter as the actual amount it owed because the sums represented 
came within $1,000.00 of the amount Plaintiff calculated that it 
owed to the IRS. 
19. On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"), 
the attorney employed by Defendant and handling the Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy for Plaintiff, telephoned the IRS to confirm the 
agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter. The IRS through its 
agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority, wrote a letter to Prince in which the IRS 
stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$61,715.41. Although Prince did not specifically refer to the 
Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by Richards 
represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued 
interest. 
20. On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the 
IRS in which he confirmed that the balance owing as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41. 
Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all 
pre-petition tax liability of Plaintiff would be satisfied. 
21. The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17, 
1985 letter. 
22. After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was 
reached between Plaintiff and the IRS, Plaintiff made payments to 
the IRS that it intended to be applied according to the Plan and 
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the agreement. 
23. Plaintiff made its first payment in August of 1985 in the 
amount of $40,000. The payment prepaid the obligation according to 
the terms of the payment schedule in the confirmed plan. Plaintiff 
paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in December of 1988. 
24. Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default 
or otherwise indicate to Plaintiff that it was in default under the 
Plan or that the IRS expected payment to have been made immediately 
after the agreement was reached in November 1984. 
25. On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS 
attempted to collect the tax liability owed by Plaintiff or from 
Roland Holmanf an officer of Plaintiff, as a responsible party. 
Each time the IRS was informed that Plaintiff was paying according 
to the Hilton Letter and the Plan. 
26. The IRS maintained an active collection ledger on 
Plaintiff between 1984 and 1990, with a variety of agents responsi-
ble for monitoring the account. 
27. Clark Holfeltz ("Holfeltz"), a revenue agent, reviewed 
the collection on the account in 1988. He suspected that certain 
of the payments had been misapplied and questioned whether 
Plaintiff had complied with the Plan. Holfeltz reconciled the 
account and no notice of default was served upon Plaintiff. 
28. Plaintiff received a letter dated October 27, 1990, 
wherein the IRS informed Plaintiff that it had recomputed Plain-
tiffs tax liability and $127,644.31 was due on the alleged default 
C:\WP51\ANDERSEN\4198.FF 6 
r ;% * • O 
V v J- wx £* 
of the Chapter 11 Plan. The IRS also demanded payment of the new 
amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set aside the order of 
confirmation or move to convert the case to a Chapter 7. After 
October 27, 1990, the IRS posited a variety of other figures 
representing the amount due based on various methods of applying 
payments made on the debt. 
29. Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief and 
injunction against the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the State of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 83C-01222 (the 
"Declaratory Judgment Action") to have Plaintiff's obligation to 
the IRS declared to be paid in full and to enjoin further collec-
tion efforts. 
30. The IRS alleged in its Trial Brief in that case that 
because Plaintiff breached its agreement with the IRS (even 
assuming the enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the payment 
schedule under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments, 
it was entitled to renew its claim to the full tax liability of the 
Plaintiff, including penalties and interest. 
31. Plaintiff prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment Action, 
the court there ruling that the Hilton Letter was binding on the 
IRS. 
32. In spite of the favorable result, Plaintiff brought this 
action to attempt to recover from Defendant its fees and costs 
incurred in pursuing the Declaratory Judgment Action. 
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CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The Plaintiff corporation was involuntarily dissolved in 
September of 1982. 
2. Plaintifffs claim arose after dissolution. 
3. Plaintiff's claims cannot be considered "wind-up" actions 
of a corporation. j 6 ^ - * 
DATED this <?< day of NovCTd5€r\1993. 
BY THE CO' 
IQNORA*LE LESLIE A. LEWI 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Pla int i f f 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this ';/L2 day of November, 1993, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand delivered to the following: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
' , . . / - • 
y i / 
/ / 
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
DEC 2 1 19 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 




Civil No. 930904013 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Based on the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law, 
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal is granted and Plaintiff's action 
is hereby dismissed with^prejudice. 
DATED this // ' day of NovmuDtif, 1993. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
2SLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this '--^  day of November, 1993, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be hand delivered 
to the following: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
- / " . / * - . / . / • « -
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual, 
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., : STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, : 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & : 
NEBEKER, a Utah professional : Civil No. 940900147 
corporation, : 
: Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Court 
considered the Motion and Memorandum filed by Defendant, Plain-
tiff's Memorandum in Opposition and the Affidavit of Roland Holman, 
as well as Defendant's Reply Memorandum. The Court denied the 
parties' requests for oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-501(3) (c) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
The following facts were undisputed by the parties for 
purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: 
$ » 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Andersen's Ford, Inc. is a former Utah corporation which 
had its principal place of business in Brigham City, Utah, 
2. On September 30, 1982, Andersen's Ford, Inc. was 
involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay 
taxes. 
3. On or about May 2, 1983, Defendant, by and through its 
employees, filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Petition as Case No. 83C-01222. 
4. For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Andersen's Ford failed 
to pay a portion of its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS. 
5. The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983, 
in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and 
penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 in the amount of 
approximately $154,004.83. 
6. The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28, 
1984, in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, 
interest and penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 in 
the amount of approximately $127,403.09. 
7. Andersen's Ford disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and 
filed an Objection to the Amended Proof of Claim on August 29f 
1984. 
8. On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
confirming Andersen's Ford's Second Amended Plan of Reorganization 
(the "Plan"). 
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9. Pursuant to the confirmed Plan, Andersen's Ford was to 
make the following payments to IRS; 
a. On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
b. On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
c. On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
d. On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
e. On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest. 
10. The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and 
had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by 
the Court. 
11. At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the 
claim of the IRS against Andersen's Ford for unpaid taxes for the 
years 1980, 1981 and 1982 had not been resolved. The Plan did not 
specify the amount of tax liability Andersen's Ford owed for said 
years. 
12. Both before and after the order confirming the Plan, 
Andersen's Ford and the IRS had numerous communications and 
exchanged information in an effort to determine Andersen's Ford's 
tax liability. The IRS possessed all relevant information and 
facts regarding the tax liability owed to it by Andersen's Ford. 
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The IRS also knew which credits should have been applied to 
Andersen's Ford's account, 
13. On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent 
Clesse Hilton ("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his 
authority and with the approval of his supervisor, wrote a letter 
("Hilton Letter") to Andersen's Ford in which the IRS stated, among 
other things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax 
and accrued interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$58,630.76. The determination of this amount was based on Hilton's 
independent review of the account records and documents reflecting 
taxes owing and payments made, and upon information supplied to 
Hilton by Andersen's Ford. 
14. By the Hilton Letter the IRS also agreed to abate all 
penalties for tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982, upon payment of 
$58,630.76, together with interest. 
15. The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the 
result of an attempt on Hilton's part to compromise Andersen's 
Ford's liability, but was his independent determination of the 
actual amount of tax and interest due. He was authorized to abate 
penalties upon payment of the tax and interest in full. 
16. Plaintiff accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton 
Letter as the actual amount it owed because the sums represented 
came within $1,000.00 of the amount Andersen's Ford calculated that 
it owed to the IRS. 
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17. On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"), 
the attorney employed by Defendant and handling the Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy for Andersen's Ford, telephoned the IRS to confirm the 
agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter. The IRS through its 
agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority, wrote a letter to Prince in which the IRS 
stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$61,715.41. Although Prince did not specifically refer to the 
Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by Richards 
represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued 
interest. 
18. On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the 
IRS in which he confirmed that the balance owing as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41. 
Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all 
pre-petition tax liability of Andersen's Ford would be satisfied. 
19. The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17, 
1985 letter. 
20. After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was 
reached between Andersen's Ford and the IRS, Andersen's Ford made 
payments to the IRS that it intended to be applied according to the 
Plan and the agreement. 
21. Andersen's Ford made its first payment in August of 1985 
in the amount of $40,000. The payment prepaid the obligation 
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according to the terms of the payment schedule in the confirmed 
plan. Andersen's Ford paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in 
December of 1988. 
22. Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default 
or otherwise indicate to Andersen's Ford that it was in default 
under the Plan or that the IRS expected payment to have been made 
immediately after the agreement was reached in November 1984. 
23. On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS 
attempted to collect the tax liability owed by Andersen's Ford from 
Roland Holmanf an officer of Andersen's Fordf Inc., as a responsi-
ble party. Each time the IRS was informed that Andersen's Ford was 
paying according to the Hilton Letter and the Plan. 
24. The IRS maintained an active collection ledger on 
Andersen's Ford between 1984 and 1990, with a variety of agents 
responsible for monitoring the account. 
25. Clark Holfeltz ("Holfeltz"), a revenue agent, reviewed 
the collection on the account in 1988. He suspected that certain 
of the payments had been misapplied and questioned whether 
Andersen's Ford had complied with the Plan. Holfeltz reconciled 
the account and no notice of default was served upon Andersen's 
Ford. 
26. In 1990, the IRS took the position that because Ander-
sen's Ford breached its agreement with the IRS (even assuming the 
enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the payment schedule 
under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments, it was 
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entitled to renew its claim to the full tax liability of Andersen's 
Ford, including penalties and interest. 
27. Andersen's Ford received a letter dated October 27, 1990f 
wherein the IRS informed Andersen's Ford that it had recomputed 
Andersen's Ford's tax liability and $127,644.31 was due on the 
alleged default of the Chapter 11 Plan. The IRS also demanded 
payment of the new amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set 
aside the order of confirmation or move to convert the case to a 
Chapter 7. After October 27, 1990f the IRS posited a variety of 
other figures representing the amount due based on various methods 
of applying payments made on the debt. 
28. Andersen's Ford brought an action for declaratory relief 
and injunction against the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the State of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 83C-01222 
(the "Declaratory Judgment Action") to have Andersen's Ford's 
obligation to the IRS declared to be paid in full and to enjoin 
further collection efforts. 
29. Andersen's Ford prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment 
Action, the court there ruling that the Hilton Letter was binding 
on the IRS. 
30. In spite of the favorable result, Andersen's Ford brought 
the action in Civil No. 930904013 to attempt to recover from 




31. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alterna-
tive, for Summary Judgment in Civil No. 930904013, which was 
granted. 
32. Despite the fact that Andersen's Ford's action in Civil 
No. 930904013 was dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff herein, 
Roland Holman, filed a Complaint in this case alleging that since 
the corporation, Andersen's Ford, was dissolved on September 30, 
1982, Holman continued to operate the business under the trade name 
of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and to "remain a client of the Defen-
dant." 
33. Plaintiff herein, Roland Holman, was a creditor of 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
34. Plaintiff herein was represented to be an officer and 
director of Andersen's Ford in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy. 
35. The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization contained a 
provision preventing the Internal Revenue Service from proceeding 
against Roland Holman to collect taxes, penalties or interest owed 
by Andersen's Ford, so long as Andersen's Ford was current on all 
payments owed to the IRS under the Plan. 
36. The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was signed by 
Roland Holman in his capacity as President of Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
The signature block appears as follows on the Second Amended Plan: 
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC. 
Bv; /s/ Roland Holman 
Its: /s/ President 
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Although Plaintiff disputes the following facts, the Court 
rules that there is no genuine issue as to the following, based on 
the materials submitted by the parties. Roland Holman's affidavit 
does not place the following facts in issue. In his Affidavit, 
Holman states he was virtually the sole shareholder of Andersen"s 
Ford and directed Andersen's Ford's activities. Those facts do 
notf however, place in issue the following facts: 
37. Prior to May 2, 1983, Andersen's Ford retained and 
employed Defendant to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah. 
38. It was the corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc., and not 
Roland Holman, who remained a client of Defendant, and it was 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. on whose behalf Defendant filed a Chapter 11 
Petition in Bankruptcy. 
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Andersen's Ford, and not Plaintiff Roland Holman, is the 
real party in interest in this matter, and is an indispensable 
party to this action since it was the client of Defendant and owns 
any legal malpractice claim. 
2. Even if Andersen's Ford had been joined as a party 
plaintiff, the case would necessarily be dismissed based on the 
doctrine of res judicata, since Andersen's Ford's identical action 
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against Defendant was dismissed with prejudice in Case No. 
930904013, Third District Court for Salt Lake County. 
3. The Court should enter an Order dismissing Plaintifffs 
complaint with prejudice, and as such, the Court does not reach 
Defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment on the merits 
of the legal malpractice claim. 
DATED this ^ cTay of J^SSl, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C:\WP51\AM0ERSEM\4198A.FF 1 0 
u — "t J 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this xtJ2- day of April, 1994, I caused the 
original of the foregoing proposed STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand delivered to the following for 
his approval as to form: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
V 
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Ois 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual, 
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 
NEBEKER, a Utah professional 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil NO. 940900147 
Judge David S. Young 
Based on the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law and 
good cause otherwise appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
(1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted, and 
(2) Plaintiff's complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED this -•" AnryY 1994, 
JUDGE DAVID 
THIRD DISTftli T JUDGE 
m i s s 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this day of April, 1994, I caused the 
original of the foregoing proposed ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE to be hand delivered to the following for his approval as 
to form: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
A W ^^^cU^Hi^^^^-
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